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For Love or Money—Or Both?
Nancy Folbre and Julie A. Nelson
T he connections between the world of money and profit and the world ofcare and concern are of great importance to society. Traditionally, the“public” world of markets and government was the realm of men, while
the “private” realm of family and social relationships was entrusted to women.
While some of women’s tasks were largely instrumental—cleaning and cooking, for
example—many tasks contained more personalized and emotional components.
Women were in charge of children, elderly, and the ill; maintaining personal
relationships; offering emotional support, personal attention, and listening; em-
bodying (or so it was understood) sexuality. This social contract is changing. As
women move increasingly into the world of paid work, many of these traditional
intimate tasks are being performed in relationships that include the explicit move-
ment of money. Paid child care, nursing homes for the elderly, talk therapy and
phone sex are just a few examples. What are economists to make of this trend?
This essay analyzes the consequences of this mixing of realms of “love” and
“money” for economic analysis, societal well-being, and public policy. We
document the empirical magnitudes of the shifts from nonmarket to market
time use, with an eye to their gender dimensions and implications for economic
theory. On a more philosophical note, we point out that most current intellec-
tual conceptualizations of these economic issues are inadequate. Whether
commentators celebrate the movement to the market or bemoan it, the use of
unexamined assumptions and outdated rhetoric is endemic to the literature. An
a priori judgment that markets must improve caregiving by increasing efficiency
puts the brakes on intelligent research, rather than encouraging it. Likewise, an
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a priori judgment that markets must severely degrade caring work by replacing
motivations of altruism with self-interest is also a research stopper. We develop
a more open and balanced framework for addressing issues of love and money.
We also evaluate the potential benefits and costs of the movement to the market
and outline important areas for research and action. The future of social,
emotional and caring work has tremendous implications for human well-being.
While such work may have been thought of as intellectually uninteresting
because it was “naturally” abundant in supply, the profound changes taking
place in gender norms sharply call into question the wisdom of continuing to
neglect this area of study.
The Shift from Family to Market
The Dependency Burden
The sweep of demographic change has transformed the relationship between
the family and the economy—and vice versa. Once upon a time, child-rearing
contributed to the family labor force and could be easily combined with income-
generating activities such as farm labor and industrial home work. It also consumed
a large share of economic resources. Times have changed. Birth rates have declined
dramatically over the long run in the United States, as in most other countries. In
1860, the total fertility rate (the number of live births a woman could expect to
have, given age-specific birth rates) was 5.2. By 1900, it had fallen below 4. In 1997,
it was 2 births per woman. Meanwhile, life expectancy at birth has increased from
47 years in 1900 to almost 77 in 1997.1
These demographic changes have reduced the aggregate burden of child-
raising, while increasing the burden of elder care. The meaning of the term
“dependent” has changed enormously over time. Still, the percentage of the
population that is under 18 combined with the percentage that is over 65—
traditionally termed the “dependency ratio”—is an important indicator of the
amount of time, energy, and money the working age population must devote to
nonworkers. As can be seen from Table 1, the percentage of the population under
the age of 18 has steadily declined in the United States, with a countervailing trend
towards an increase in the share of the population 65 and over. From now until
2050, the Census Bureau’s “middle-series” projections suggest that changes in these
two portions of the population roughly balance out, so that the dependency ratio
won’t change much. However, in 2050 the number of those under 18 will nearly
equal the number of those over age 65, a far different distribution of the dependent
population than in 1870 or 1900, when children outnumbered the elderly by ratios
of 15:1 or 10:1.
Of course, the specifics of dependency are very different for a five year-old, a
1 On birth rates, see Coale and Zelnick (1963, p. 36) and National Vital Statistics Report (April 29, 1999,
Table 4). On mortality, see Historical Statistics of the United States (Series B 107-115, p. 55) and National
Vital Statistics Report (June 30, 1998, Table 4).
15 year-old, a healthy 65 year-old, and an ailing 90 year-old. Even if individuals aged
65-75 are economically dependent in the sense that they receive Social Security and
Medicare, this age group has also seen recent improvements in health and activity
levels. The number of individuals 85 and older, who tend to require very high levels
of direct care, is projected to grow from about 1.6 percent of the population to
about 4.6 percent between 2000 and 2050.
Labor Force Categories
We use the somewhat anachronistic term “homemaking” to describe women’s
nonmarket work because it conveys the nature of the caring activities intertwined
with the household production involved. Both men and women typically combine
some homemaking activities with paid employment. However, many women have
historically specialized in full-time homemaking. Historical research and early
census surveys show that women worked about the same hours per week providing
goods and services for family members as paid workers did in their formal jobs (and
women typically worked many more hours when young children were present in
the home).
If we assume that women devoted about as much productive effort to paid
and unpaid work combined as men did to paid work, we can construct estimates
of the total labor force, including both paid and unpaid workers (Folbre and
Wagman, 1993; Wagman and Folbre, 1996). Assuming that 85 percent of all
women 16 and over were engaged in productive (paid or unpaid) work, and
those who did not have paying jobs were full-time homemakers, we can trace the
historical shift in the use of women’s time.2 Table 2 shows that in 1870, about
2 This 85 percent figure represents a low-end estimate, extrapolating from the fact that between 1870
and 1960, about 85 percent of all men 16 and over had paying jobs. In data from 1960, about
34.4 million women listed “keeping house” as their reason for not being in the paid labor force. If they
Table 1
Changes in the Age Structure of the Population of the United
States, 1870–2050 (age groups as percent of total population)
Under 18 Over 65
Under 18
Plus Over 65
1870 45.5% 3.0% 48.5%
1900 40.3 4.1 44.4
1930 35.0 5.4 40.4
1960 35.5 9.3 44.8
1990 26.0 12.5 38.5
2000 (proj.) 25.8 12.6 38.4
2050 (proj.) 24.4 20.0 44.4
Sources: Data for 1870–1960 from Historical Statistics of the United States (Series A
119–134, p. 15). Data for 1990 from Statistical Abstract of the United States (1997,
Table 14, p. 15). Projections for 2000 and 2050 from Statistical Abstract of the
United States (1999, Table 17, middle series).
40 percent of the entire productive labor force (paid and unpaid, male and
female) was made up of full-time homemakers (Wagman and Folbre, 1996,
p. 50). This percentage has declined along with increases in the relative
importance of paid employment among women, with the biggest change com-
ing between 1960 and 1990. By 2000, homemaking had declined substantially,
but still involved over 16 percent of all workers, and about 30 percent of all
women workers.
Many of the women entering wage employment have moved into jobs
considered socially appropriate for women, contributing to a persistent pattern
of occupational gender segregation (Blau, 1998; Reskin and Roos, 1990). Many
have shouldered responsibilities that involve paid care for others, leading to
segregation by industry as well as occupation. To illustrate this trend it is helpful
to create a category we will call “professional care services” by combining the
standard industrial classifications of “Hospitals,” “Health Services except Hos-
pitals,” “Educational Services,” and “Social Services.” Table 3 puts employ-
ment in this category in the context of the overall labor market. In 1900,
about 4 percent of all workers were employed in professional care services.
By 1998, about one-fifth of the paid labor force was engaged in a professional
care industry. Meanwhile, employment in “Domestic and Personal Services”
declined from 9.3 percent of the labor force in 1900 to 3.4 percent by 1998.
Clearly, the economic role for jobs that reflect the more skilled and emotionally
complex dimensions of the traditional homemaker’s role has increased dramat-
ically in the twentieth century. Today, hospitals and schools should now count
as much in forming our image of wage employment as factories and construc-
tion sites.
are added to those who had paying jobs in that year, they amount to about 93 percent of the female
population over age 16 (Historical Statistics, Series D 11-25). Since 1960, male labor force participation
rates have fallen to about 74 percent. It is likely that some of this decline reflects an increase in the
number of men who have retired early and increased time devoted to homemaking, as well as an
increase in years spent in education.
Table 2
The Decline of Full-time Homemaking in the United States, 1870–2000
Homemakers As % Of All
Women Workers
Women In Paid Jobs As %
Of All Women Workers
Homemakers As
% Of All Workers
1870 70.2% 29.8% 40.1%
1900 64.4 35.6 35.6
1930 59.7 40.3 34.1
1960 56.0 44.0 29.1
1990 32.7 67.3 22.0
2000 29.5 70.5 16.4
Source: U.S. Census. For discussion of data for 1870–1930 see Wagman and Folbre (1996). Data for 1960
from Historical Statistics of the United States (Series A 119–134); for 1990 and 2000 from Statistical Abstract
of the United States (1997, Tables 21 and 620).
Women remain concentrated in professional care industries. Of all women in
paid employment, 31.3 percent were employed in these industries in 1998; women
constituted 46.2 percent of the paid labor force over age 16, but 76.3 percent of
those employed in “Hospitals,” 79 percent in “Other Health Services,” 68.7 percent
in “Educational Services,” and 81.8 percent in “Social Services” (Employment and
Earnings, January 1999, Table 18). The ways in which these care industries are
structured will have especially important implications for women workers, as well as
for the welfare of children, the sick, and the elderly. We will return to these
implications later.
Time Use Studies
An alternative way of tracing the shift of caring activities into the paid labor
market focuses on the changing patterns of time use. Canada and Australia, as well
as most countries within the European Community, now conduct regular surveys
based on detailed time diaries. Unfortunately, what we know about time use trends
in the United States is based on relatively small and unrepresentative surveys, and
often based on stylized questions rather than detailed time diaries.
A theme emphasized in much of the historical literature on time use is “the
endless day”—homemaking seems to expand whatever time is available, and stan-
dards of cleanliness and quality have ratcheted up over time (Cowan, 1980).
Another probably more important factor is the high income elasticity of demand
for homemaker’s services. Technological innovation has clearly reduced the time
necessary to perform many domestic tasks. In 1975, for instance, homemakers
worked about 30 hours less per week in preparing meals and cleaning up than they
did in 1910 (Lebergott, 1993, p. 59). On the other hand, standards of quality
have gone up and activities such as shopping have become much more time-
consuming—partly because more money is being spent.
Table 3
The Rise of Professional Care Service Industries
(employment by industry as a percentage of total employment)
Professional
Care Services
Domestic and
Personal
Services
Other
Services
Agriculture
Fishing
Forestry
Manufacturing,
Mechanical, and
Construction
1870 — — 10.4% 53.5% 22.7%
1900 4.0% 9.3% 16.7 37.6 30.1
1930 7.1 10.7 28.7 21.7 31.6
1960 11.9 6.6 40.7 9.4 31.4
1990 17.6 4.0 45.7 2.8 25.1
1998 19.2 3.4 52.1 2.7 22.7
Sources: For 1870–1930, estimates are based on Historical Statistics of the United States (Series D 152–166).
For 1960, figures are from Employment and Earnings (January 1961, Tables B-2, A8). These figures are for
December 1960 and are based on the assumption that all private household workers were engaged in
domestic and personal services. Figures for 1990 are from Employment and Earnings (January 1991, Table
28). Figures for 1998 are from Employment and Earnings (January 1999, Table 18).
The decline of fertility and the expansion of education have reduced the total
amount of time devoted to child care. But in an analysis of historical time use data,
Bryant and Zick (1996a, b) show that parents may also have increased the amount
of time they spend per child. It seems that paid child care tends to displace “on-call”
time when most of parental attention was already elsewhere, rather than primary
care time. As families purchase more services, they may reallocate their nonmarket
time and effort away from material production towards the personal and emo-
tional. Increased freedom to explore career opportunities outside the home means
that the time that women devote to homemaking is given more freely—and
perhaps more joyously—than before.
On the other hand, efforts to combine paid work and family responsibilities
lead to stresses and strains. Pressure on single mothers has increased, with provision
of public assistance now largely conditional on paid employment. When married
mothers increase their hours of market work, husbands seldom increase their hours
of nonmarket work to help compensate (Hartmann, 1981; Bittman and Pixley,
1997). The time and effort that women devote to homemaking tends to lower their
earnings, even net of effects on labor force experience and job tenure (Waldfogel,
1997; Hersch, 1991). Widespread awareness of this pattern has contributed to a
proliferation of studies of how men and women bargain over the allocation of time
and responsibility as well as money in the household (Mahoney, 1995; Deutsch,
1999).
The difficult circumstances faced by single parents and dual-career families
with young children help to explain the heated debate over whether Americans are
working longer or shorter hours overall (Schor, 1991; Robinson and Godbey,
1997). In recent years, leisure time has become more unevenly distributed; surveys
suggest a mismatch between individual preferences and work schedules (Jacobs
and Gerson, 1998), largely generated by the difficulties of combining paid employ-
ment with responsibilities for the care of family and community.
Measurement of Economic Growth
The harder one thinks about nonmarket work, the more arbitrary the conven-
tional picture of economic development begins to seem. The conventional history
of economic growth embraces the unsurprising insight that when labor was real-
located from the family, where society didn’t place a dollar value on output, to the
market, where it did, the economy appeared to have grown.
Nonmarket activities valued solely on the basis of labor inputs account for a
sizable proportion—between 40 percent and 60 percent—of the total value of all
U.S. output (Eisner, 1989). Even this striking estimate contains a sizeable down-
ward bias, since the market wages being imputed to women homemakers are
lowered both by discrimination and by the time and effort put into nonmarket
work. Furthermore, “total economic product,” which includes the value of non-
market work, grows at a very different rhythm and rate over time than gross
domestic product (Wagman and Folbre, 1996). The macroeconomic implications
depend largely on relative rates of growth in the market and nonmarket sectors, as
well as on methods of imputing a value to nonmarket production. However, it
seems likely that conventional estimates that omit such imputations altogether
overstate economic growth and exaggerate cyclical variation.
The European Union is now committed to the development of “satellite”
national income accounts based on estimates derived from regular time use surveys.
Interest has grown in developing better methods of imputation, applying house-
hold production functions that include measures of the value of household capital
and raw materials (Ironmonger, 1996).
However, a larger and more serious methodological problem looms. The
exercise of imputing market values to homemaker output is based on the presump-
tion of perfect substitutability between home-produced goods and commodities.
This presumption is plausible for most material goods and for many services. It
matters little to most people, for instance, who vacuums their floors or cleans their
toilets.
But purchased services are only partial substitutes for personal services in
which the identity of the care provider and the continuity of the care relationship
matter. As families purchase more services, they probably reallocate their nonmar-
ket time and effort away from material production toward the personal and
emotional dimensions of care. There is good reason to believe that the personal
and emotional content of home life is becoming more and more concentrated in
a relatively small number of activities, such as sharing meals or telling bedtime
stories, for which substitutes cannot be purchased. Past a certain point—which our
society has yet to define or negotiate—family time cannot be reduced without
adverse consequences for all family members. The greater the role that personal
and emotional care play in nonmarket work, the greater the downward bias in
market-based estimates of its value. In this sense, the economy itself is forcing
economists to think seriously about concepts of care that have never played much
role in our disciplinary vocabulary.
Thinking about Care and Commodities
The word “care” has a dual meaning, on the one hand referring to caring
activities, like changing diapers or providing a listening ear, and on the other hand
to caring feelings, like those of concern or affection on the part of a caregiver.3
Caring feelings on the part of the caregiver are assumed to provide a motivation for
doing caring activities, and to assure the effectiveness of the care received. Ideally
a care recipient should feel authentically “cared for,” nurtured, recognized and
valued as an individual, emotionally supported, empathetically connected, or in
shorthand, loved. There is a sharp division of views about whether markets, caring
feelings, and caring activities are at odds with each other.
To economists who take the view that social, familial, and sexual behavior has
3 The distinctions between care as an activity and care as a motivation have been discussed by Tronto
(1987), Wærness (1984), Abel and Nelson (1990), Himmelweit (1996), and Folbre and Weisskopf
(1998).
always been (at least implicitly) a matter of choice and exchange, as in much of
Gary Becker’s vision of economics, the movement of caring work into markets may
be merely a rearrangement of activities in response to income and relative price
changes. No qualitative change need be implied, and if anything, the new arrange-
ments should (ipso facto, since they are a matter of choice) be leading to greater
economic efficiency. Such a view recognizes no special category of distinctly per-
sonal, intimate human feelings and interactions, and may encourage a Candide-
like, best-of-all-possible-worlds complacency in the face of the marketization of care.
Others see the worlds of commodities and of care as being at odds, and fear
that marketization of care might tend to “crowd out” caring feelings. The concern
here is that motivation by money may lead to caring activities being performed to
minimum standards, mechanically and impersonally, unaccompanied by the per-
sonal love and attention that we believe that children need to grow, sick people
need to heal, and so on. Such resistance to the movement of caring tasks into the
market comes from both sides of the political spectrum. On the left, an abiding
suspicion of capitalism leads to a fear that monetization of care will lead to care
becoming an impersonal commodity, produced at least cost and sold to the highest
bidder (Weisskopf and Folbre, 1996; Carruthers and Espeland, 1998). On the other
hand, many social conservatives decry paid child care, for example, as in all ways
inferior to mother provided care (at least if the mother is married and middle
class), and try to demarcate a special, protected sphere of “family values” (for
example, Weber, 1994).
Before turning to empirical evidence on this debate, we should broaden the
discussion beyond such a priori judgments, and think more carefully about move-
ments of money, motivations, and “the market.”
Money Moves in Various Ways
Impersonal, anonymous payments are only one way that money moves. It also
moves within personal relationships, as gifts to friends, allowances to children,
sharing between spouses, thefts, coerced donations, and so on. We have yet another
vocabulary for money that moves towards or from the government, through taxes
and transfers, and still other terms for ransoms, reparations, bonuses, tips, rewards,
and so on (Zelizer, 1995). A parent may be obliged to pay “child support,” a
movement of money based in the concern to provide for the child, rather than in
exchange. Or consider the reparation payments recently given to Asian women who
had been forced into sex work by the Japanese military during World War II. The
social meaning of these payments reflects a recognition that these women’s human
rights were fundamentally violated, and that they deserve an apology and some
form of restitution. But if the only way we understood payment was via the model
of exchange, then such payments would be merely delayed wages for prostitution
services.
Even when money is explicitly given in exchange for goods or services, the
relationship between the participants need not be one of anonymity and ad hoc
timing. Child care markets can be examples of “rich” markets in which the
movement of money is only one dimension in a complex relationship of child,
caregivers, and parents including elements of (when it is going well) trust,
affection, and appreciation. Other markets for caring services often have similar
dimensions.
Motivations
What are the motivations of paid caregivers? In some discussions it seems as if
a dichotomy is posed: one works either for love or for money—that is, out of
spiritual values, affection, and altruism, or out of crass materialism, self-interest,
and greed. Such a dichotomy implicitly assumes, however, first, that market agents’
actions spring from their own unquenchable wants, and second, that agents are
autonomous and unconnected self-sufficient beings. Neither assumption is useful
in this context.
While it has become unfashionable in mainstream economics to talk about
“needs,” in fact the very human need for basic food and shelter is at the base of
most work “for money.” In a technologically complex, interdependent market
society, we provide for ourselves—or get our “provisioning,” in the terms of Nelson
(1993)—largely through exchange. The fact that we engage in exchange does not
prove that we are insatiable materialists. Most workers are not achieving nor seeking
to achieve a hedonistic aim of ever-higher material pleasure or a controlling
economic power.
The assumption that people are insatiable, autonomous and self-interested
agents, which has traditionally formed the core of neoclassical economic analysis,
has been called into question by many critics, and most recently by feminist
theorists who argue that such a model, far from being a sign of “rigor,” is a sign of
gender bias at an intellectual level (Nelson, 1993, 1996; England, 1993). While men
have stereotypically been associated with autonomy and individual accomplish-
ment, women have traditionally been identified primarily through physical and
social connection, as bearers of children, cooks, wives, and so on. Neglecting the
“connected” aspects of human life—including physical need, responsibility for
others, and altruism—is a form of gender bias, in that aspects of human life
traditionally associated with femininity are being irrationally downplayed.4
As well as providing for their own needs, most people at some point in their
lives will want money for their children’s clothes and education, or their parents’
medical bills, or a favored organization or charity. Real people enter into respon-
sibilities, and in such cases, the assumed dualism between self-interest and altruism
can be deconstructed and a new understanding that includes the dimension of
responsibility built up. Even just taking responsibility for one’s own basic needs, so
as not to be a burden on others, is certainly not a purely selfish action.
Thus, being motivated to take a job in large part “for the money” need not
4 One must also mention a darker side to connected, emotional motivations: hate as well as love may be
a powerful motivator (Nelson, 1999). Some care activity providers physically, sexually, and/or emotion-
ally abuse the people in their care, whether these people are in their own family or met through their
paid activities. The question of motivations has many more twists and turns than the “love or money”
formulation allows.
imply that one is a materialistic and selfish person. One could, of course, let
self-interest overtake altruistic concerns and do the work in a cold-hearted way, but
this is not implied a priori. One could, in fact, be exceptionally nonmaterialistic
and generous.
To the extent that more nuanced explanations of motivations have historically
been deployed in popular argument, they typically have been used to justify a family
wage for men. For example, a working man pictured as a “breadwinner” has been
commended for providing for the needs of his wife and children. While he was
assumed to be self-interested as an economic actor in the workplace, this same
individual was assumed to be purely “altruistic” after he crossed the front door into
his home (Folbre and Hartmann, 1988). The rhetoric of luxury and selfishness
seems to be particularly reserved for women who, at least if their husband earns a
decent income, are often condemned as neglecting their family’s needs if they take
paid work. However, shared financial responsibility and single parenthood have
made such notions, while perhaps rhetorically still resonant, increasingly out of
tune with family realities.
It may also be helpful in illuminating the question of motivations to distinguish
between activities that have complex meanings and motivations, and activities solely
motivated by payment. Philosopher Margaret Jane Radin (1996, p. 105), for exam-
ple, makes this distinction between what she calls “work,” and mere “labor:”
It is possible to think of work as always containing a noncommodified human
element; and to think of the fully commodified version as labor . . . Laborers
are sellers; fully motivated by money, exhausting the value of their activity in
the measure of its exchange value. Laborers experience their labor as sepa-
rate from their real selves. Workers make money but are also at the same time
givers. Money does not fully motivate them to work, nor does it exhaust the
value of their activity. Work is understood not as separate from life and self,
but rather as a part of the worker, and indeed constitutive of her. Nor is work
understood as separate from relations with other people.
Such a distinction recognizes that there can be “giving” elements in what are often
thought of as “commodified” exchanges.
Traditional neoclassical economists, of course, might reply that the economics
profession has already dealt with these issues, by including consideration of non-
pecuniary rewards in the theory of “compensating wage differentials.” According to
this theory, all else equal, jobs with worse working conditions should pay more.
Translated to the case of caring activities, it implies that if some people enjoy
caring, they will be willing to accept a lower wage to do these activities, essentially
taking part of their “pay” in good feelings.5 However, this analysis relies on the
5 Sometimes this line of thought gets turned around into an inference that those who are willing to
accept less to do caring work must therefore be more motivated by caring feelings, and a conclusion that
the lower the pay is, the better the care! For a detailed discussion of the logical fallacies in such
reasoning—in particular, its neglect of the question of opportunity cost—see Nelson (1999).
assumptions of core neoclassical theory that agents are assumed to have their
preferences exogenously given and to be radically autonomous and self-interested.
That is, their identity and tastes are set before they enter the labor market; activities
in the market register only as yielding this fixed entity more or less utility. Other
social sciences and philosophy, in contrast, have a broader understanding of work
and motivation. Distinctions such as Radin’s posit that “work” is part of the creation
of persons, and of the relations with other people that form the interactive
environment of people’s lives.
Relevant discussion of these issues has also taken place at the juncture of
economics and psychology, by scholars such as Bruno Frey (1997, 1998). Frey looks
at empirical evidence on the effects on workers of extrinsic motivation (like pay) vs.
intrinsic motivation (“when they undertake an activity for its own sake,” 1998,
p. 441). He finds (1998, p. 444, emphasis in original) that external motivations like
pay “crowd-out intrinsic motivation if they are perceived to be controlling and they
crowd-in intrinsic motivation if they are perceived to be acknowledging.” This insight
suggests that too direct a pay-for-specific-services approach to the compensation of
caring activities could shift the perceived locus of control outside the worker, so
that the activities are no longer “work” in the sense of expressing will and agency
and building a relational network, but become merely “labor” motivated by pay
alone.6 On the other hand, if the movement of money is understood as an
acknowledgment and appreciation of the worker’s own intrinsic motivations, it can
strengthen such motivations.
Do Markets Inevitably “Commodify”?
If markets create a greased chute which causes every activity to be fully
commodified eventually—turned from personal to impersonal, and from group-
interested to self-interested—then we can expect dramatic changes from the ex-
plicit entrance of markets into the provision of women’s traditional helping ser-
vices. Marxist-influenced thinkers often raise a ghastly specter of complete
commodification. They would not accept the idea that “work,” as defined above, is
possible under capitalism, since monetization and exchange under capitalism are
themselves seen as inevitably causing commodification. On the other hand, hard-
core neoclassicals present an ideal of universal commodification. To them as well,
“work” would be a largely irrelevant concept, since the concept of “labor” (plus
some possible nonpecuniary rewards) explains it all. But as Radin (1996) points out
in her discussion of these views—and as reiterated by Kenneth Arrow (1997) in his
extensive discussion of her work—whether markets inevitably lead to commodifi-
cation is really an empirical matter.
In hypothetical idealized markets, in which purely self-interested autonomous
agents interact mechanically, commodification is a given. In contrast, real-world
markets are often domains of rich and complex social relationships, including
6 Frey’s own applications have been to the arts and to siting of undesirable facilities. He has not, to our
knowledge, studied care.
aspects of reward, appreciation, reparation, gift, and so on.7 The extent to which
commodification actually occurs is shaped by societal norms and public policies,
which may put particular and specialized limits on the way in which some things—
say, health care—can be bought and sold on markets. Disagreements about com-
modification—for example, about so-called “surrogate motherhood”—attest to
areas of lively resistance to full commodification. If we remember that commodi-
fication is a matter of social understanding, rather than something that is essential
to the good or activity, we are less likely to fear markets per se and more likely to
pay close attention to the actual conditions of caring activities. For example, Frey’s
(1998) point about the salutary effect of “acknowledging” forms of compensation
could be the starting point for a research program on preserving healthy, intrinsic,
noncommodified motivations.
This discussion of money, motivation, and commodification should offer
sufficient reason for dismissing any a priori blanket judgment about the effects of
the movement of caring work into the market realm. With a more flexible frame-
work for analysis in mind, we can now move on to more detailed analysis.
Implications for Well-Being and Policy
We see women’s traditional caring activities being done more and more in
relationships that include the explicit movement of money. For evaluating the
effects of this change, it is not sufficient to compare idealized conceptions of home
and market, nor of love and money. Intelligent evaluation involves a more detailed
analysis of the actual structures of caregiving and the level of support caregiving
receives.
Advantages of the Family-to-Market Move
One obvious benefit of creating more public and marketed alternatives to
family care is the greater freedom it allows for women, who were traditionally
expected to do the bulk of such work, irrespective of their own individual variations
of interest and talent. While love was (and is) certainly an element in motivating
provision of home-provided care, the historical roles of coercion and quid pro quo
exchange should not be forgotten. Historically, many women lacked a viable
alternative to providing homemaker, mothering, personal nursing and sexual
services, since labor market barriers denied them an alternative means of self-
support. Marriage was close to an economic necessity for a young female.8
Decreasing the coercive nature of traditional demands on women can also
have positive effects for the recipients of care. The recent reduction in the labor
market barriers facing women, and the greater availability of alternative provision
7 Other social scientists are also engaging in more in-depth discussion of markets. See, for example,
Carrier (1997).
8 When a woman had no outside options, feminist commentators have noted, it is hard to avoid the
conclusion that traditional marital structures contained something of a sex-for-money trade.
of care for the young, sick, and feeble elderly, can mean that care activities, when
done in private, may increasingly be done more as a matter of choice and less as a
matter of necessity. This should raise the quality of care that is provided in private
situations, since those who are totally uninterested or untalented in this area will
now opt for other activities, while those who do opt to provide them are more likely
to be intrinsically motivated.
In taking the burden of care off particular women, who had been assigned to
it by status considerations, the marketization of care could contribute to the costs
of care being more widely and equitably distributed, and the provision of care
could in some ways be accomplished more effectively. Tasks traditionally done in
the home were varied and complex, and there could be advantages to applying
increased specialization within each class of activities. A traditional at-home care-
giver is a generalist. She (it was traditionally a “she”) is not likely to have the
knowledge of the developmental stage of four year-olds possessed by a nursery
school teacher (and should she obtain it, by then her child would be five). Nor is
she likely to have the medical skills of a visiting nurse, the listening skills of a trained
psychotherapist, and so on. Shifting at least some aspects and intensities of care-
giving to those with specialized training and experience (and who receive the pay
that rewards their investment in skill) should raise the quality of care.9
The movement from private to public may have other benefits as well. Because
of the relative impersonality of market norms, public provision may enhance some
people’s sense of being in control of their own lives. Some senior citizens would
rather be cared for by a paid “outsider” than a family member, for example,
because this enhances their feeling of independence.
Finally, the greater attention to care issues, and the skill requirements of care,
may aid in the economic analysis of work and well-being, as we recognize the value
of caring work (like empathetic listening) in workplaces in general and, conversely,
the value of knowledge and skill in the locations where care is provided. In the
movement from private to public, researchers have become more cognizant of what
constitutes good care. For example, in the literature on child development, the old
contrast between merely “custodial” day care “by strangers” in institutional centers
versus “loving care in the home,” has been replaced by a more careful analysis
which concludes (to put it simplistically) that good care is good, and bad care is
bad, wherever it takes place. Children on average seem to benefit, or at least not be
hurt, when their mothers engage in paid work (Blau and Grossberg, 1992; Harvey,
1999). Some studies have found small negative implications of maternal employ-
9 Note that the aspect of specialization highlighted here is quite different from that put forward by Gary
Becker (1985), who justified a sexual division of labor along traditional homemaker/breadwinner lines
by assuming increasing returns to investment in homemaking skills (as a class) and development of skills
more commonly required in paid work (as a class). The analysis here disaggregates homemaking skills.
The assumption that a sharp trade-off exists between home and market skills (see also Hewlitt, 1991) is
also called into question by the experience of the many men and women who now combine paid work
and unpaid family care. If our image of human nature includes both valuing autonomy and accom-
plishment on the one hand, and connection and nurturance on the other, then it follows that variety
in tasks is preferred, and there are diminishing returns to hyper-market or hyper-home involvement.
ment for children under the age of one—which may be caused by the fact that good
care for infants is very time-intensive and therefore costly for the market to
provide—but these effects tend to disappear as the child ages (Blau and Grossberg,
1992). Whether at home or at other locations, the importance of relationships,
knowledge, and environment in providing effective caregiving is becoming clearer.
Disadvantages of the Family-to-Market Move
Reliance on markets for the provision of care does pose some significant risks.
One concern is whether market competition in these areas will produce high-
quality care. Dependents such as children, the sick, and the elderly seldom meet
the standards for consumer sovereignty. These dependents do not necessarily know
what is best for them. They are easily misled, even abused. Even if they have control
over income, they may lack the ability or the information they need to make good
decisions as consumers. Payments for their care are often made by third parties,
and the time-extensive and highly personal character of care work makes it expen-
sive to monitor quality.
Evidence suggests that quality of care is highly variable. Nursing homes offer a
case in point. Many are privately run but receive government payments for care of
the indigent elderly through Medicaid. According to Consumer Reports, about 40
percent of nursing homes repeatedly fail to pass the most basic health and safety
inspections (Eaton, 1996). The General Accounting Office (1999) recently re-
ported that government inspections of nursing homes across the country each year
show that more than one-fourth cause actual harm to their residents. Turnover
rates among nursing home aides are high, amounting to almost 100 percent within
the first three months.
Child care suffers from less extreme but still serious quality control problems.
A recent comprehensive survey argues that the physical and emotional environ-
ment in many child care centers remains relatively poor, partly because of lax
regulation in many states (Helburn, 1995). Pay levels for child care workers are
seldom much above minimum wage, and high turnover rates in the child care
industry, averaging about 40 percent per year, preclude the development of long-
term relationships between caregivers and young children. Voluntary accreditation
by the National Association for the Education of Young Children tends to improve
quality. A recent California study, for instance, rated 61 percent of accredited child
care centers as good in 1997, compared to only 26 percent of those seeking
accreditation the previous year. Nationwide, however, only 5,000 out of the nation’s
97,000 child care centers were accredited (Whitebook, 1997). Furthermore, many
children in paid child care are in small informal family settings, rather than centers,
where quality is even more variable. In the rush to expand child care slots to
accommodate the exigencies of welfare reform, some states have provided child
care vouchers that can be used virtually anywhere, including for unlicensed care,
and so may actually have a negative effect on average quality.
Even working age adults find it difficult to monitor care quality. The number
of factors that come into play in choosing the best health maintenance organiza-
tion, for example, is mind-boggling. Yet increased competition among health care
providers creates incentives to cut costs by minimizing hospital stays and nursing
care. A recent study published in the Journal of the American Medical Association found
that several measures of the quality of care are significantly lower in for-profit than
nonprofit health maintenance organizations (Himmelstein et al., 1999).
Improved regulation might mitigate such problems for health maintenance
organizations. But regulation is no magic wand. It is implemented through a
political process that is highly susceptible to rent-seeking and corruption. The
nursing home, health, and child care industries devote significant resources to
lobbying the members of Congress in charge of regulatory legislation.
A second reason to be concerned about market provision is that care creates
important externalities that cannot always be captured in individual transactions.
Many people share in the benefits when children are brought up to be responsible,
skilled, and loving adults who treat each other with courtesy and respect. Employers
benefit from lower monitoring costs when their workers are cooperative, trustwor-
thy, and intrinsically motivated. The elderly benefit if a skilled younger generation
of workers generates high Social Security and Medicare taxes. Fellow citizens gain
from having law-abiding rather than predatory neighbors.
These gains cannot be captured fully by those who created them. Parents can’t
demand a fee from employers who hire their adult children and benefit from their
productive efforts. Nor can they send a bill to the spouses and friends of those
children for the value of parental services consumed. When child care workers or
elementary school teachers genuinely care for their students, they foster an eager-
ness to learn and willingness to cooperate from which later teachers and employers
will benefit. When nurses do a good job, patients’ families and employers benefit.
Anyone who treats another person in a kind and helpful way creates a small benefit
that is likely to be passed along. A growing body of research on social capital shows
that an atmosphere of trust and care contributes not only to the development of
human capital, but also to economic efficiency (Coleman, 1988; Putnam, 1993,
1995).
Like other externalities, however, those created by care create an incentive to
free ride, to let others pay the costs. In the absence of collective coordination less
than optimal amounts of care will be provided, because care providers are not fully
compensated for the social value of their services. Some amount of care for
dependents will persist because it is embedded in our genes and reinforced by our
culture. But if individuals who respect and fulfill norms of care come to be seen as
losers in the competitive economic game, we may see a gradual erosion of the
supply of unpaid care services (England and Folbre, 2000). There are limits to the
substitutability between family and market provision, limits that our society needs
to discuss, define and enforce.
A third concern is the evolution of markets for care themselves, which may be
shifting away from “rich” markets embedded in local communities to a “thinner,”
more impersonal form. Residential mobility and job mobility are high in the United
States, making it more difficult to sustain long-term relationships. National for-
profit chains have moved into the fields of health and child care provision. Of
course, there are countervailing trends: the decreased cost of travel, the emergence
of new forms of communication such as e-mail, the use of webcams to monitor child
care centers. If policymakers want to make distinctions between markets structures
that bring out the best in people and those that bring out the worst, we need to
develop better ways of studying these and monitoring the evolution of care markets
over time.
A fourth concern is that markets may increase freedom of choice about
caregiving primarily for middle-class, white, U.S.-born women, while worsening, or
at least not improving, the lot of other groups. Employees in all but the most highly
credentialed care industries are predominately female and disproportionately peo-
ple of color, and pay and benefit levels are typically low. The recent political shift
(in the guise of “welfare reform”) to a belief that putting one’s dependents in paid
care and taking a job is financially and logistically feasible for all parents has likely
worsened the standard of living for women with especially high personal caring
responsibilities and low market wages. A predominant ideology that saw women as
homemakers may have been severely limiting to their life possibilities. However, it
implicitly recognized the importance of caring labor, in a way that recent policies
do not.
Conclusion
Academic economists as a profession are not in a position to dictate our
preferred solutions. We are, however, well placed to have some influence on
cultural conceptions about economic activity as well as on the design of public
policy. Because of the influence of economists on cultural conceptions, it is vitally
important that as a profession we have a good grasp on the distinction between the
idealized hypothetical market of impersonal exchange and real markets with their
dimensions of provisioning, relationships, and incomplete commodification. Econ-
omists who talk about contemporary economic activity as if it were fully represented
by an idealized hypothetical market—and as if dualisms of self-interest vs. altruism
or money vs. love were simply insurmountable—may find that their models work in
certain narrow economic sectors, but are spectacularly ill-equipped to provide the
kinds of understanding necessary to analyze markets involving care. Moreover, such
rhetoric reinforces in the public mind that when one acts on the market, one is
expected to be heartless and strive for pure personal advantage, and that this is all
there is or can be. The cultural message here can be a powerful one. If an
economist wants markets to erode the quality of care, using this rhetoric would be
one tool for advancing that goal.
The shift of caring activity from family to markets represents an enormous
social change. Markets on their own are unlikely to provide the particular volume
and quality of “real” care that society desires for children, the sick, and the elderly.
The increasing intertwining of “love” and “money” brings the necessity—and the
opportunity — for innovative research and action. Issues of market structure, work
environments, incentive schemes, regulatory requirements, and most importantly,
adequate financial support for care, cannot be neglected. Economists and policy-
makers can reevaluate our tools for research, as we reevaluate the roles of individ-
uals, families, firms and governmental bodies in the provisioning of the care that we
all, at many times in our lives, so critically need.
y We wish to thank Barbara Bergmann and Paula England for helpful discussions of these
issues. Nancy Folbre acknowledges financial support from the MacArthur Foundation Net-
work on the Family and the Economy, and Julie Nelson acknowledges the support of the
Charlotte Perkins Gilman Fellowship for Research in Caring Labor.
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